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Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: A Plurality's Proposal
to Alter the Evidentiary Burdens in Title VII
Disparate Impact Cases
The disparate impact theory of employment discrimination received its ju-
dicial imprimatur in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' In Griggs the United States
Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 forbids any
employment practice which, although neutral on its face, operates to deny job
opportunities to persons protected by Title VII unless the employer can show
that the practice is "related to job performance."'3 Although Griggs was decided
in 1971, courts remain in disagreement over both the proper scope of the theory
and the allocation of the evidentiary burdens of proof and production. In Wat-
son v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,4 a unanimous Supreme Court decided that
disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective or discretionary employ-
ment practices which have a discriminatory effect on protected groups. 5 This
holding extended the scope of the theory, which had traditionally been applied
only to standardized employment tests.6 Responding to defendant's contention
that the practical effect of such an extension would be to force employers to
adopt quota systems, a plurality of the Court7 argued that henceforth the burden
of proof should be on the plaintiff to show that the discriminatory employment
practice was not justified as a business necessity.8 This Note focuses primarily
on the evidentiary standards proposed by the plurality. It demonstrates that the
probable effect of these evidentiary standards, which stand in stark contradiction
to past Supreme Court and federal appellate formulations, is that future plain-
tiffs will find it virtually impossible to prevail on a disparate impact claim. The
Note concludes that although additional safeguards may well be necessary to
protect employers from a profusion of expensive litigation, shifting the burden of
justification to the plaintiff is not an acceptable solution to the problem.
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
3. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
4. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
5. Id. at 2786-87.
6. See, ag., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (rule against employing drug addicts); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (written test of verbal skills); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) (written aptitude tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (high school
diploma and written aptitude test).
7. Justice O'Connor wrote for the plurality and was joined by Justices White and Scalia, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Kennedy had not yet been seated at the time of oral argument
(January 20, 1988) and thus took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Confronted
with the same question in a future case, however, Justice Kennedy might well join the Watson plu-
rality to make new law. In a more recent employment discrimination case, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam), Justice Kennedy joined Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist to grant a rehearing of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976), even though neither party in the case requested reconsideration. A 7-2 majority in
Runyon held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of private contracts." Id. at 168.
8. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
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In 1973 Fort Worth Bank and Trust hired Clara Watson, a black female, as
a proof operator.9 The Bank promoted Watson to the position of motor bank
teller in 1976.10 In 1980 Watson applied for two supervisory positions which
had recently been vacated. Though she was considered for the positions, Wat-
son received neither promotion. Mr. Richard Burt, a white male who had been
the supervisor of the bookkeeping department, became supervisor of tellers in
the main lobby. 1 Pat Cullar, a white female, became supervisor of the motor
bank. 12 Watson was promoted, however, to commercial teller and informal as-
sistant to Burt. Watson again applied for the position of supervisor of tellers in
the main lobby when the Bank promoted Burt. Cullar was selected to fill this
vacancy. Watson then applied for the position vacated by Cullar, but Kevin
Brown, a white male teller in the motor bank, received this promotion.13
After exhausting her administrative remedies with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Watson fied suit on October 21, 1981, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged that the
bank had discriminated against her and other persons similarly situated on the
basis of race in violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964.14 The dis-
trict court first disposed of the class claims.15 It then proceeded to consider
9. Id. at 2782.
10. Id.
11. Brief for Respondent at 2, Watson (No. 86-6139). Mr. Burt, who also had experience in the
general ledger department and as a credit analyst, received his bachelor of arts degree in banking and
finance shortly after his promotion. Id.
12. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2782. Cullar had been the assistant to the main lobby supervisor prior
to her promotion. In addition, she had eighteen years of banking experience. Brief for Respondent
at 2, Watson (No. 86-6139).
13. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S.
Ct. 2777 (1988). The bank had not developed formal criteria for evaluating applicants for the four
positions Watson unsuccessfully sought. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2782. The supervisor over the open
job position had the responsibility for interviewing each of the applicants and filling the position
according to his or her best judgment. Each of the supervisors who denied Watson's applications for
promotions was white. Id.
Burt testified that he considered supervisory experience, leadership ability, and the ability to get
along with others as primary factors in his decisions. Brief for Respondent at 2, Watson (No. 86-
6139). Burt further testified that he considered Cullar better qualified than Watson because there
was resentment among the other tellers who had been under Watson's supervision during the time
she was Burt's assistant. Id. at 3. Further, Burt testified that he preferred Brown over Watson
because of Watson's inability to get along with others. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); see Watson, 798 F.2d at
794. In particular, Watson alleged discrimination against blacks in "hiring, compensation, initial
placement, promotions, terminations, and other terms and conditions of employment." Watson, 108
S. Ct. at 2782.
The elements of a discrimination claim under § 1981, which is the codified version of a portion
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, parallels those of a claim under Title VII. Note, Evaluation of
Subjective Selection Systems in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases: A Misuse of Disparate
Impact Analysis, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 549, 553 n.11 (1986). For a comparison of § 1981 and Title
VII, see Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of
Race Discrimination Under 42 US.C § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207 (1979).
15. Initially the district court "certified a class consisting of 'blacks who applied to or were
employed by [respondent] on or after October 21, 1979 or who may submit employment applications
to [respondent] in the future.'" Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2782 (quoting Watson, 798 F.2d at 794).
After considering this evidence at trial, however, the district court decertified this broad class be-
cause no common question of law or fact united the groups of applicants and employees. Id. at
2782-83. After splitting the broad class into two classes, one for employees and the other for appli-
cants, the court then decertified the class of black employees because it failed to meet the numerosity
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Watson's individual claims under the evidentiary standards applicable to dispa-
rate treatment cases.16 The court found that Watson had established a prima
facie case of discrimination, but that the bank had met its burden of persuasion
in each instance by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of
the promotion decisions. 17 Concluding that Watson had failed to carry the bur-
den of persuasion that the bank's articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimi-
nation, the district court dismissed the action.' 8 On appeal Watson argued that
the district court should have also considered her claim under the disparate im-
pact analysis set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.19 Affirming the district
court's judgment,20 a 2-1 majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that promotion systems which use discretionary or subjective
criteria are properly analyzed on the disparate treatment model, not the dispa-
rate impact model.21
Recognizing a conflict between the courts of appeals on the question of
whether disparate impact analysis should be applied to subjective employment
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Id. at 2783. Further, the court found that
Watson was not an adequate representative of the class of applicants because her claims of discrimi-
nation in promotion were not typical of members of that class. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2783.
16. In a disparate treatment action the plaintiff-employee attempts to show that he is the victim
of intentional, yet covert, discrimination on the part of the defendant-employer. Furnish, A Path
Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 after Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. RaV. 419, 419 (1982). The evidentiary burdens of
such cases were first enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). First the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (ii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff. Id. If the employer meets this burden of pro-
duction, the plaintiff then carries the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's stated reason
for rejecting the applicant was in fact a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of race. Id.
at 804.
17. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2783.
18. See Watson, 798 F.2d at 792. In the three instances in which Burt and Collar were pro-
moted over Watson, the court credited the bank's assertion that Watson had less banking and super-
visory experience than the chosen applicants. The court was more troubled with the promotion of
Brown, who had less experience than Watson. The court relied on Brown's experience of supervis-
ing summer employees at Six Flags Over Texas and his strong performance as a teller to uphold his
promotion. Watson, 798 F.2d at 799; see also supra note 13 (discussing the process by which the
bank made promotion decisions).
19. 421 U.S. 424 (1971); see Watson, 798 F.2d at 797.
20. The court of appeals did not find any abuse of discretion in the district court's decertifica-
tion of the two classes. It did, however, vacate the portion of the judgment regarding the black
applicants and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss those claims without prej-
udice. Watson, 798 F.2d at 799.
21. Id. at 797. The court here relied exclusively on Fifth Circuit precedent to reach this deci-
sion. See, eg., Lewis v. National Labor Relations Bd., 750 F.2d 1266, 1271 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1985);
Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin
State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 1983); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th
Cir. 1982). But see Page v. U.S. Indus., 726 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984) (district court properly
applied disparate impact analysis to discretionary promotion system). The Watson court suggested
that it would have decided in accordance with Page if this were a case of first impression and thus
not "constrained by Pouncy and its progeny." Watson, 798 F.2d at 797 n.12.
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criteria,22 the United States Supreme Court granted Watson's petition for a writ
of certiorari23 and vacated the judgment of the court of appeals. 24 Justice
O'Connor, delivering the opinion of the Court, found that disparate impact anal-
ysis may be applied to discretionary or subjective employment practices. 25
While recognizing that the Court had typically analyzed discretionary criteria
under the disparate treatment model,26 O'Connor asserted that the effectiveness
of disparate impact analysis in evaluating the discriminatory effects of facially
neutral, objective criteria "could largely be nullified" if the analysis were re-
stricted to the appraisal of objective criteria.27 Selection systems that combine
both objective and subjective criteria would have to be considered "subjective in
nature."'2 8 Thus, an employer who included at least one subjective criterion in
her selection system and avoided making the objective criteria "absolutely deter-
minative" could effectively isolate the entire system, including the objective cri-
teria, from disparate impact analysis.29 Moreover, the Court noted that
disparate treatment analysis is inadequate in some cases to prevent the discrimi-
natory effects of subjective criteria.30 According to the Court, employers often
do not intend to discriminate when they use subjective criteria in their selection
process, but "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices" sometimes produce dis-
cretionary decisions skewed against individuals and groups protected by Title
VII.31 O'Connor concluded, "If an employer's undisciplined system of subjec-
22. Seven circuits have applied disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria. See, e.g., Atonio
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (separate hiring channels); Griffin v.
Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (multicomponent promotion process); Hawkins v. Bounds,
752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (postal office promotion practices based on subjective evaluations);
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (challenging work assignment and promotion prac-
tices), cert denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (professor tenure decision); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d
Cir. 1983) (fire department promotion activities); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical
Control, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (refusal to rehire following layoff).
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits typically have not applied disparate impact analysis to subjective
criteria. See, eg., E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply impact analysis). But see, e.g., Bunch v. Bullard,
795 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying impact analysis but only implicitly discussing subjectiveness);
Page v. U.S. Indus., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying impact analysis).
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have reached such incongruous results that their typical ap-
proach cannot be determined. For the Seventh Circuit, see, eg., Griffin v. Board of Regents, 795
F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply impact analysis). Contra Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673
F.2d 921 (7th Cir.) (applying impact analysis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982). For the Eighth
Circuit, see, eg., McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply impact
analysis), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988); Talley v.
United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984);
Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981) (same). Contra Gilbert v. City of Little
Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying impact analysis), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
23. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
24. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2779.
25. Id. at 2787.
26. See supra note 16.
27. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. These subconscious stereotypes and prejudices were a "lingering form of the problem
that Title VII was enacted to combat." Id. In this case, for instance, one supervisor told Watson
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tive decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by im-
permissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII's
proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply."'32
Defendant objected that application of disparate impact analysis to subjec-
tive criteria would leave employers who cannot afford the considerable expense
of defending such practices with equally uninviting choices. First, employers
could eliminate all subjective criteria from their systems. 33 Success at many
jobs, however, depends in great measure on qualities that cannot be measured
through standardized tests, such as common sense, good judgment, and the abil-
ity to cooperate with coworkers. 34 Most employers, then, would "find it impos-
sible to eliminate subjective selection criteria" while remaining committed to
hiring the best available employees. 35 Second, defendant argued, employers
could rely on surreptitious quota systems to guarantee that no plaintiff could
establish a statistical prima facie case.36 In drafting Title VII, however, Con-
gress explicitly refused to require employees to hire by quota in order to protect
against liability. 37
A plurality of the Court 38 found merit in defendant's contentions. In an
attempt to protect employers from this potential Hobson's choice, the plurality
offered a "fresh and somewhat closer examination" of the evidentiary standards
applicable in disparate impact cases. 39 To establish a prima facie case, the plain-
tiff must make three showings. First, a plaintiff must present adequate statistical
evidence to demonstrate a disparity in the employer's work force.4° Second, the
plaintiff must isolate and identify a specific employment practice allegedly re-
sponsible for the disparity.41 Third, the plaintiff must prove causation through
statistical evidence "of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in
question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of
their membership in a protected group." 42
If the plaintiff carries the burden of proving a prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts to the defendant, who must produce evidence that "its em-
ployment practices are based on legitimate business reasons."'43 Although
Griggs had stated that the employer had the "burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
that a supervisory teller position was a big responsibility "with a lot of money.., for blacks to have
to count." Brief for Appellant at 7, Watson (86-6139).
32. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
33. Brief for Respondent at 38, Watson (86-6139).
34. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
38. See supra note 7.
39. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
40. Id.
41. Id. Defendants are free to attack this statistical evidence in a number of ways; for example,
if the data pool is too small, or contains the wrong individuals or "inadequate statistical techniques."
Id. at 2790.
42. Id. at 2788-89.
43. Id. at 2790.
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tion," 44 the plurality in Watson stated that "such a formulation should not be
interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the
defendant. On the contrary, the ultimate burden of [proof] ... remains with the
plaintiff at all times." 45 Finally, after the defendant meets this burden of pro-
duction, the plaintiff must " 'show that other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate in-
terest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "46 Proving the existence of a
less discriminatory alternative selection device, the plurality noted, would be
"relevant in determining whether the challenged practice has operated as the
functional equivalent of a pretext for discriminatory treatment. '47
Refusing to join in the plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun asserted that the
plurality's discussion of evidentiary standards applicable in disparate impact
cases "is flatly contradicted by our cases."'48 Blackmun stated that although the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof with regard to the prima facie case, a plaintiff
who successfully carries this burden and establishes a prima facie case "shifts the
burden of proof, not production, to the defendant to establish that the employ-
ment practice in question is a business necessity." 49 Noting that the plurality's
suggested allocation of evidentiary burdens closely resembled those established
for disparate treatment cases,50 Justice Blackmun suggested that crucial differ-
ences between the two types of claims should effectuate different evidentiary
standards.51 A prima facie case of disparate treatment, which raises only an
inference of discrimination,52 does not "require a trial court to presume, on the
basis of the facts establishing a prima facie case, that an employer intended to
discriminate."'5 3 A prima facie case of disparate treatment, then, shifts the bur-
den of production to the defendant, but is insufficient to shift the burden of
proof.5 4 A prima facie case of disparate impact, on the other hand, "directly
establish[es]" that the employment practice has a disparate effect on a protected
group 55 In disparate impact cases, therefore, "[t]he plaintiff... already has
proved that the employment practice has an improper effect; it is up to the em-
44. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
45. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
46. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
47. Id. at 2790. In other words, ifa less discriminatory alternative practice was available to the
defendant, which the defendant failed to adopt, then the defendant must have been using the more
discriminatory practice as a pretext for intentional discrimination. See infra note 119.
48. Id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring). Justice Ste-
vens agreed that disparate impact analysis should be applied to subjective criteria but did not think it
wise or necessary to formulate a new set of evidentiary standards. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
49. Id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50. See supra note 16.
51. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2793 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978) (prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of imper-
missible factors").
53. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2793 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Blackmun, ., concurring).
55. Id. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ployer to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified."'5 6 Blackmun con-
cluded that allowing an employer merely to articulate, rather than to prove,5 7 a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification "is simply not enough to legitimize a
practice that has the effect of excluding a protected class from job opportunities
at a significantly disproportionate rate."'58
Title VII prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to [his employment] because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin."'5 9 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.° the United States
Supreme Court announced that this prohibition extended to facially neutral em-
ployment practices which, although "fair in form," are "discriminatory in oper-
ation." 6 1 The thirteen black plaintiffs in Griggs succeeded in showing that
defendant's requirement of a high school diploma for transfer to higher-paying
departments denied significantly more blacks than whites the opportunity of
transfer.62 Plaintiffs' statistical proof sufficed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and convinced the Court to shift the burden to defendant to jus-
56. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Blackmun took issue with the plurality's concern that the impossibility of validating subjec-
tive criteria as "job-related" with mathematical certainty would force employers to adopt quotas.
The proper means of validation, Blackmun stated, will vary with the type of job and the size and
type of business. Id. at 2795-96 ("Courts have recognized that the results of studies, the presentation
of expert testimony, and prior successful experience, can all be used, under appropriate circum-
stances, to establish business necessity." (citations omitted)) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 2796 ("[The bald assertion that a
purely discretionary selection process allowed respondent to discover the best people for the job,
without any further evidentiary support, would not be enough to prove job-relatedness.") (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
60. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. Id. at 431. The Court stated that the primary purpose of Congress in enacting Title VII
was the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id.
Furthermore, plaintiffs should not have to prove that the discrimination was intentional: "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion." Id. at 432; cf. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrim-
ination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1299-1310 (1987) (Legislative history and statutory language
demonstrate that Congress identified nonintentional, pretextual discrimination as a problem, but left
the federal courts to design a solution. Griggs was a first attempt at a judicial solution.). But cf.
Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition
of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429,497-503
(1985) (Title VII intended only to prohibit intentional discrimination, similar to constitutional pro-
hibition against discrimination).
For arguments that the Griggs Court did not intend to create a separate conceptual definition of
discrimination, see Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria" The Significance
of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VI, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1, 35 n.139.
62. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. Duke Power, a power company in North Carolina, had openly
discriminated against blacks prior to the enactment of Title VII. All black workers had been sum-
marily restricted to the labor department, regardless of qualifications. Beginning July 2, 1965, the
day on which Title VII became effective, the company instituted a new policy allowing employees to
transfer from the labor department to higher-paying jobs if the employee had both a high school
diploma and achieved a passing score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests. Id. at 428.
Duke Power insisted that the requirements were added to "improve the overall quality of the work
force." Id. at 431. Plaintiffs' statistical evidence revealed, however, that while 34% of all white
males in North Carolina had completed high school by 1960, only 12% of black males had done so.
Similarly, while 58% of all white males passed the two intelligence tests, only 6% of blacks had done
so. Id. at 430 n.6.
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tify its practices. 63 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, de-
scribed the defendant's evidentiary burden in several ways. "The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice... cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 64 Also, the defendant must
show that the practice "bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful per-
formance of the jobs for which it was used."'65 Finally, the defendant has "the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question." 66 Despite offering these varying formulations,
the Court did not state explicitly whether the employer's burden was one of
proof or of production. 67
Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions made clear that the defendant's
burden of rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case was a burden of proof. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,68 a disparate impact case decided in 1975, the
Court stated that when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 69 the employer
must "meet the burden ofproving that its tests are 'job-related.' "70 In Washing-
ton v. Davis7 1 the Court explained that meeting a burden of production would
not suffice to rebut a plaintiff's evidence of disparate impact.
[I]t is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis for
the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be "val-
idated" in terms of job performance.... However this process pro-
ceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference
to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives
72
63. Id. at 431-32.
64. Id. at 431.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 432.
67. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) ("[W]ords such as 'articulate,'
'show,' and 'prove,' may have more or less similar meanings depending on the context in which they
are used.").
68. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
69. As the Court made plain, the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant unless and
until the plaintiff first carries the burdens of production and proof on the issue of discriminatory
effect: "This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination, Le., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or
promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Id. at 425.
Curiously, the Court here cites McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a disparate
treatment case, in support of this proposition. See supra note 16.
The defendant may initially defend itself by attacking the plaintiff's statistical evidence. To this
end, the defendant can, for example, dispute the accuracy of the plaintiff's statistics, see, e.g., Robin-
son v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 US. 822 (1977),
or argue that the plaintiff's evidence does not accurately reflect the labor market, see, e.g., Move-
ment for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir. 1980).
See generally Note, supra note 14, at 561-62 (suggesting employers' defenses to plaintiff's prima facie
case).
70. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).
71. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72. Id. at 247 (footnote omitted). Lower appellate courts have also interpreted Griggs as shift-
ing a burden of proof to defendant. See, eg., McCosh v. City of Grand Forks, 628 F.2d 1058 (8th
Cir. 1980); Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1980); Ramirez v. Hofheinz, 619 F.2d
442 (5th Cir. 1980); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); Donnell v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th
Cir. 1975); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The Court's next disparate impact case was Dothard v. Rawlinson.7 3 In
Dothard plaintiff was denied employment as a correctional counselor (prison
guard) because she failed to meet the 120-pound weight and five-foot-two-inch
height requirements established by the state of Alabama for all law enforcement
officers. 74 The Court's majority opinion, following Albemarle and Griggs,
agreed that when the plaintiff establishes discriminatory impact the burden of
proof shifts to defendant to demonstrate the job-relatedness of the practice. 75 In
Dothard defendant argued that the height and weight requirements were predic-
tive of the strength of the applicant, an attribute essential to job performance as
a prison guard. 76 The Court rejected this argument, stating that defendant's
purpose could be achieved by "adopting and validating a test for applicants that
measures strength directly."' 77 In concurrence, however, Justice Rehnquist for
the first time suggested that the defendant need only meet a burden of production
to rebut a prima facie case: "Appellants [defendants], in order to rebut the prima
facie case under the statute, had the burden placed on them to advance job-
related reasons for the qualification."' 78 The standard propounded by Rehnquist
here would reduce the defendant's burden significantly, for the difference be-
tween demonstrating a relationship between an employment practice and job
performance by an offer ofproof, and merely asserting that such a relationship
exists is profound.79
In 1981 the Court clearly limited the defendant's evidentiary burden in dis-
parate treatment cases. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine80
the Court stated that although the defendant needed to produce some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's rejection, the defendant "need not per-
suade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons."' 81 In
light of the Burdine decision, defendants in disparate impact cases began to ar-
gue that the evidentiary burdens in such cases should parallel the burdens in
73. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
74. Id. at 323-24. The district court found that these height and weight requirements would
exclude over 41% of all women but less than 1% of all males. Id. at 329-30.
75. Id. at 329.
76. Id. at 331. At trial, however, defendant produced no evidence correlating these require-
ments to the requisite amount of strength considered necessary for effective performance as a prison
guard. Id.
77. Id. at 332.
78. Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977),
another disparate impact case, Justice Rehnquist again implied that the defendant had to meet a
burden of production: "[We agree with the District Court in this case that since there was no proof
of any business necessity adduced with respect to the policies in question, that court was entitled to
'assume no justification exists.'" Id. at 143. Of course, if the defendant had the burden of proving
business necessity but offered no evidence in this regard, the district court would not have merely
been "entitled" to assume no justification exists; it would instead have been required to find for
plaintiff.
79. Furnish, supra note 16, at 430. In Dothard Justice Rehnquist cited McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the seminal case on disparate treatment, to support his pro-
posed evidentiary standard. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In McDonnell
Douglas the Court held that a defendant may rebut plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment
by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDon-
nell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see supra note 16.
80. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
81. Id. at 254.
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disparate treatment cases.8 2 In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc. 8 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit accepted this argument. The
NAACP and other minority organizations brought suit against the Wilmington
(Delaware) Medical Center, alleging that a relocation of the medical center to
the suburbs would have a discriminatory effect on minorities. 84 Although the
suit involved a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,85 the court
of appeals relied exclusively on Title VII disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment cases, including Burdine, to reach its decision. The court found that
"[d]isproportionate impact or effect is simply an additional method of demon-
strating impermissible discrimination under Title VII. ' ' 86 Accordingly, the
court concluded that under either theory of discrimination defendants bear only
a burden of production: "All things considered, uniformity in the procedural
aspects of impact and intent cases is highly desirable and should not be sacrificed
on the dubious theory that plaintiffs advance here. Although we need not wor-
ship at its shrine, symmetry is not always sinful."
'87
In contrast, the other eleven federal circuits did not alter the allocations of
burdens of proof in disparate impact cases in response to Burdine.88 For exam-
82. See, eg., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 521 F. Supp. 656, 660 (N.D. Tex.
1981) ("The Bank understandably reads much into the Burdine decision."), vacated on other
grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
83. 657 F.2d 1322 (3rd Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 1324-25.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
86. NAACP, 657 F.2d at 1334.
87. Id. at 1336. For a discussion of this case, see Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards Following
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372, 388-90 (1982).
In Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit applied this same
principle in a Title VII action: "As with claims of discriminatory intent, the burden of persuasion
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant need only come forward with evidence to
meet the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case." Id. at 991 (citation omitted).
In more recent disparate impact cases, the Third Circuit has ignored its Croker decision not to
place a burden of proof on the defendant. In Green v USX, 843 F.2d 1511, 1521 (3d Cir. 1988),
defendant had the burden of "demonstrating the business necessity of each of the criteria that it
uses." The court in Green explained that "[d]isparate impact analysis is best understood as a bur-
den-shifting device that fairly and reasonably apportions the burdens of proof between the parties in
a manner that is best suited to achieve the desired goals of Title VII." Id. at 1522-23; accord Massar-
sky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983).
88. See, eg., Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 1988); Washington v.
Elec. Joint Apprenticeship and Training Comm., 845 F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 371 (1988); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 409 (4th Cir. 1988); Wislocki-Goin
v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1113 (1988); Falcon v. Gen-
eral Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1508
(10th Cir. 1987); Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 779 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1985); Lowe v. City
of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d
561, 572 (4th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (1st Cir. 1984); Walker v. Jefferson
County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1556-57 (1 Ith Cir. 1984); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d
1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (1 1th Cir. 1982);
Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982);
Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1252 (6th Cir. 1981); Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 136 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Guardians Ass'n of New York v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 235
(2d Cir. 1981); McCosh v. City of Grand Forks, 628 F.2d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1980); Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980).
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ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded Johnson
v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.8 9 to the district court with orders to determine whether the
defendant had met its burden of proving that its educational requirements were
a justified "business necessity." 90 On appeal, however, the United States
Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of
Burdine.9 1 Rejecting the Court's implicit invitation to establish parallel eviden-
tiary burdens for impact and intent cases, 92 the Fifth Circuit stated that the
burden on a disparate impact defendant differs from the burden placed on a
disparate treatment defendant because distinct prima facie cases must be estab-
lished by the respective plaintiffs.93 A prima facie case of disparate treatment
raises an inference of intentional discrimination which the defendant can rebut
by articulating a legitimate business reason for the challenged conduct.94 To
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, on the other hand, the plaintiff
cannot rely on a mere inference of discriminatory effect; 95 he must prove, using
statistical evidence, that the questioned practice has an actual discriminatory
effect.9 6 The court stated, "It is not part of the plaintiff's burden to prove ab-
sence of a legitimate business reason for the challenged practice. Knowledge of
a legitimate business reason is uniquely available to the employer who is accord-
ingly required to persuade the court of its existence by a preponderance of the
evidence." 97 The court of appeals again remanded the case to the district court,
concluding that the evidentiary burdens in disparate impact cases were "unaf-
fected by Burdine."98
In Watson the plurality allocated the burdens of production and proof in a
89. 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
90. Id. at 427 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
91. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
92. In a disparate impact case following Burdine, the Supreme Court itself did not reduce the
defendant's evidentiary burden to that of an intent case. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47
(1982). When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact case, "the employer must then
demonstrate that 'any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion,' in order to avoid a finding of discrimination." Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
93. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
967 (1982).
94. Id. at 753 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
95. Id. In a disparate treatment case the dispositive issue is the defendant's intent; the defend-
ant tries to rebut directly the inference of intentional discrimination raised by plaintiff's prima facie
case. In a disparate impact case, on the other hand, the defendant's business necessity argument
does not attempt to rebut evidence of a discriminatory effect, but is an affirmative defense: the
defendant admits that the practice has a discriminatory effect, but contends that the practice is
nevertheless justified as a business necessity. See Smith, supra note 87, at 392-96.
96. Uncle Ben's, 657 F.2d at 753. The Burdine Court explicitly warned against transposing the
disparate treatment analysis to disparate impact cases: "We have recognized that the factual issues,
and therefore the character of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected classes." Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252 n.5; see, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977).
97. Uncle Ben's, 657 F.2d at 753.
98. Id. The court of appeals noted that the "respective burdens in a disparate impact case are
... governed by clear and recent Supreme Court precedent unaltered by Burdine." Id. (citing
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 329 (1971)). In a strong dissent, District Judge Daniel Thomas,
sitting by designation, argued that if the Supreme Court had not intended to alter the evidentiary
burdens in disparate impact cases through Burdine it would not have remanded this case for recon-
sideration in light of Burdine. Id. at 754 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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scheme similar to the model articulated by the Third Circuit in NAACP v. Medi-
cal Center, Inc.99 The plaintiff first must prove that the challenged employment
practice has a statistically significant discriminatory effect. In rebuttal the de-
fendant must produce evidence that it uses the discriminatory practice for some
legitimate business purpose. 10 To prevail, the plaintiff must then show that a
less discriminatory alternative selection process exists.10 This set of evidentiary
standards represents a fundamental change from the model formulated in Griggs
and Albemarle and followed in the overwhelming majority of subsequently de-
cided cases.102  It must be remembered, however, that the Griggs-
Albemarle line of cases typically concerned objective employment practices. The
plurality revised the allocation of the burdens of production and proof as a re-
sponse to its fears that extension of the disparate impact analysis to subjective
criteria might force employers to adopt quota systems or to engage in preferen-
tial treatment.10 3 The issue, then, is whether quotas and preferential treatment
are a likely result of the extension of impact analysis to subjective criteria, and if
so, whether this possibility justifies the plurality's proposed evidentiary
standards.
The plurality suggests two reasons why extension of impact analysis to sub-
jective criteria increases the risk that employers will be forced to adopt quotas or
engage in preferential treatment. First, because a plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case by using "bare statistics," any imbalance in the employer's work force
would be a potential source of Title VII liability. 1°4 Since it is "unrealistic to
suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad inno-
cent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances," employers' response would
be to adopt quotas "to ensure that no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima
facie case."105 This argument, however, rests on the faulty premise that exten-
sion of impact analysis to subjective criteria would make it easier for plaintiffs to
establish prima facie cases. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must iso-
late and identify the specific employment practice allegedly responsible for the
observed disparity.' 0 6 As the Watson plurality admits, although satisfying this
requirement "has been relatively easy to do in challenges to standardized tests,"
99. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
100. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
103. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-91.
104. Id. at 2787.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2788; see also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir.
1987) (listing as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case the identification of specific subjective
employment practices); cf. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
discriminatory impact model ... is not, however, the appropriate vehicle from which to launch a
wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company's employment practices."). But ef. Green
v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1524 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Applying disparate impact analysis to this
employer's hiring 'system' and measuring the disproportionate 'effects' on minority hiring that result
may impose a difficult burden upon the employer, but not an unfair one."); Griffin v. Carlin, 755
F.2d 1516, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) (" '[O]ur disparate-impact cases consistently have considered
whether the result of an employer's total selection process had an adverse impact upon the protected
group.'" (quoting Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting))).
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it can impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs when the employer's selection process
includes subjective criteria.10 7 If anything, then, extending disparate impact
analysis to subjective criteria would appear to make it more difficult for a plain-
tiff to establish a prima facie case, and, accordingly, less likely that employers
would be pressured to adopt quota systems.
Second, employers might adopt quotas because the inefficiency and expense
of justifying each subjective criterion would be prohibitive. The plurality con-
tended that although objective tests and criteria can be justified through formal
validation studies which measure whether a given selection criterion accurately
predicts on-the-job performance, "'validating' subjective selection criteria in
this way is impracticable."10 8 The plurality also recognized, however, that em-
ployers are not required to produce formal validation studies even to justify the
use of objective criteria. 10 9 Courts have allowed employers to use other methods
to prove the job-relatedness of a specific selection criterion, including independ-
ent national studies,' 10 presentation of expert witnesses, 1 1 and prior successful
experience. 112 Elsewhere in its opinion, the plurality insisted: "In the context of
subjective or discretionary employment decisions, the employer will often find it
easier than in the case of standardized tests to produce evidence of a 'manifest
relationship to the employment in question.' "113 Again, however, it is unclear
why extending disparate impact analysis to include subjective criteria would in-
crease the pressure on employers to adopt quotas if justifying subjective criteria
as job-related is easier than justifying objective criteria.
The primary effect of the plurality's proposed evidentiary standards would
be that future plaintiffs would find it virtually impossible to prevail on a claim of
disparate impact. This is true for at least two reasons. First, when the defend-
ant's burden of justifying its practice is reduced from one of proof to one of
production, it is the plaintiff who must bear the burden of persuasion on the
107. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 ("The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employ-
ment practice that is challenged. Although this has been relatively easy to do in challenges to stan-
dardized tests, it may sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria are at issue.").
108. Id. at 2787. Justice.O'Connor continued:
Some qualities-for example, common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty,
and tact-cannot be measured accurately through standardized testing techniques. More-
over, success at many jobs in which such qualities are crucial cannot itself be measured
directly. Opinions often differ when managers and supervisors are evaluated, and the same
can be said for many jobs that involve close cooperation with one's co-workers or complex
and subtle tasks like the provision of professional services or personal counseling.
Id.
109. Id. at 2790-91; see New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976).
110. See Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1985) (nationwide studies and
commission reports of job-relatedness of college degree requirement for police officer), cert denied,
476 U.S. 1116 (1986).
111. See id. at 219-22 (four expert witnesses testify as to the correlation between performance of
police officer and college degree).
112. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729
F.2d 85, 96 (2nd Cir. 1984) (generations of experience reflecting job-relatedness of decentralized
decisionmaking structure based on peer judgments in academic setting can be used to show business
necessity).
113. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791 (emphasis added).
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issue of job-relatedness. In other words, in order to prevail a plaintiff must
prove both that the practice in question has a discriminatory effect and that the
practice is unjustified because it does not predict on-the-job performance. In the
vast majority of instances, however, plaintiffs simply do not have the access to
resources and information necessary to carry this latter burden. When justifica-
tion requires formal validation studies, employees will typically lack the finan-
cial resources necessary to have these studies carried out. 114 Even in those
instances in which formal validation studies are not required, an adequate show-
ing of the job-relatedness of the challenged practice requires a detailed under-
standing of the position, the knowledge and skill required to perform its duties,
and the probable consequences of the employer's having to make future selec-
tions without using the criterion. 115 This information is uniquely available to
the employer, not the employee.' 16
Second, even if a given plaintiff could successfully carry its burdens of proof
on the issues of discriminatory effect and job-relatedness, under the plurality's
proposed evidentiary standards this plaintiff would still have to show the exist-
ence of a less discriminatory alternative. 117 As initially conceived in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody,1 8 a plaintiff's showing of a less discriminatory alternative
"would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for
discrimination."'1 19 Consequently, the Albemarle Court shifted this burden to
114. Smith, supra note 87, at 396.
115. Id. at 395.
116. Even with the sophisticated use of discovery devices, because this knowledge would have to
be obtained from the employer's supervisors, of whom some might not be particularly forthcoming
in response to a plaintiff's deposition or interrogatory questioning, an employee's ability to prevail
would be "drastically undercut." Smith, supra note 87, at 395-96.
117. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790. The plurality in Watson maintained that "when the defendant
has met its burden of producing evidence .... the plaintiff must 'show that other tests or selection
devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate in-
terest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Albemarle, 422
U.S. at 425).
118. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
119. Id. at 425. There has been some disagreement about whether the less discriminatory alter-
native issue is a part of the larger issue of business justification or instead is an opportunity for
plaintiff to prove that the challenged practice was a pretext for intentional discrimination. In Con-
treras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982), the court stated that an employment practice cannot be justified if plaintiff has made a show-
ing of a less discriminatory alternative.
A practice that is unjustifiable in race and sex neutral business terms is not always the
product of intentional discrimination. The decision makers may simply have missed a less
discriminatory option. In such an event we could speak of "negligent discrimination."
Id.; accord NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1335 (3d Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
A careful reading of Abemarle, however, demonstrates that a showing of a less discriminatory
alternative goes directly to the question of intentional discrimination. The Court cited McDonnell
Douglas as authority for the relevance of such a showing in impact analysis, intimating that the
question of intentional discrimination also has a place in disparate impact cases. Smith, supra note
87, at 402-04; see supra note 16. Moreover, in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
587 (1979), the Court did not even give the plaintitf an opportunity to demonstrate a less discrimina-
tory alternative: "The District Court's express finding that the rule was not motivated by racial
animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination."
The Beazer Court thus makes clear that an employment practice successfully justified as job-related
can nevertheless be found discriminatory only if plaintiff proves that the employer maintained the
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the plaintiff only if the defendant first proved that the challenged practice was
job-related.1 20 In Watson, on the other hand, the burden arises as soon as the
defendant produces any evidence of job-relatedness. 121 Safely assuming that de-
fendants will be able to articulate at least one legitimate business purpose to
support its practice, 122 henceforth every plaintiff would have to show a less dis-
criminatory alternative in order to prevail.
On a theoretical level this conclusion plainly contradicts the assertion in
Griggs that employment practices which operate to exclude minorities are
strictly prohibited unless they can be shown to be related to job performance. 123
The Watson plurality would allow an employer to maintain employment prac-
tices proven by plaintiff to be both discriminatory in operation and unjustified by
business necessity unless the plaintiff can simultaneously offer the employer an
alternative practice equally suited to her needs. 124 Arguably this arrangement is
entirely too solicitous of employers' interests. On a practical level, requiring
plaintiffs to show a less discriminatory alternative would make it virtually im-
possible for a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate impact theory. Although the
Albemarle Court articulated the "less discriminatory alternative" defense over
thirteen years ago, a review of the voluminous case law reveals that no plaintiff
has ever successfully demonstrated a less discriminatory alternative to a chal-
lenged practice.1 25
The plurality in Watson properly recognized that traditional disparate im-
pact analysis sometimes imposes too weighty a burden on defendants. Some
job-related practice for the purpose of intentionally excluding persons protected by Title VII. See
Smith, supra note 87, at 404.
120. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Although few cases have comprehensively considered this as-
pect of the analysis, courts have consistently held that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof for this
issue, and the burden does not arise unless the defendant has met its burden of proof on the issue of
job-relatedness. See, eg., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,447 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 116 (1986); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1261 n.9 (6th Cir. 1981). But see Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B) (1988) ("[w]henever a validation study is
called for by these guidelines, the user should include, as a part of the validation study, an investiga-
tion of suitable alternative selection procedures").
121. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
122. Smith, supra note 87, at 395.
123. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
124. Because a showing of a less discriminatory alternative goes principally to the intent of the
employer to engage in pretextual discrimination, requiring plaintiffs to make such a showing in effect
requires plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination. See supra note 119. This conclusion strongly
supports the thesis of one commentator who has argued that a merger of disparate impact theory
and disparate treatment theory is inevitable. Furnish, supra note 16, at 440.
125. This is true at least in reported cases. The only possible contrary example might be Officers
for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("this court finds it inappropri-
ate to use [the agility] test since no evidence of its validity has been presented"). See generally
Rothschild and Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests An Illustration of the Limits of
the Judicial Process, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 261, 272-73 (1982) (issue of whether a less discriminatory
alternative exists has "rarely, if ever, been reached in a testing case"); Lamber, supra note 61, at 44-
45 n.168 (no cases reported where plaintiff had demonstrated less discriminatory alternative);
Rutherglen, supra note 61, at 1326 (in practice, plaintiff almost never carries this burden); Booth and
MacKay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L.J.
121, 190 (1980) ("There have been no cases in which a plaintiffhas demonstrated acceptable alterna-
tives to the use of a validated test.").
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courts have required and continue to require defendants to prove that the chal-
lenged practice is absolutely necessary to proper operation of the business. 126
Setting such remarkably high standards might well force employers to adopt
quotas or engage in preferential treatment in order to avoid expensive litiga-
tion.12 7 In future cases the Court should make it clear that defendants can meet
the burden of proof on the issue of job-relatedness without demonstrating that
forbidding the challenged practice would seriously damage the business.128 The
Court should not, however, adopt the set of evidentiary standards proposed by
the Watson plurality. The Griggs Court declared that the goal of Title VII was
the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment." 129 Relieving employers of the burden of justifying selection practices
proven to affect adversely the employment opportunities of minorities does not
advance efforts to reach this goal, but instead disserves Title VII by discouraging
legitimate claims. Since the employer established and maintained the challenged
practice, the employer, not the employee, should bear a reasonable burden to
defend it if it turns out to be discriminatory.
W. GREGORY RHODES
126. See, eg., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979) ("business
necessity" defense is "very narrow," especially on a motion for summary judgment), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971)
(requirements of "business necessity" doctrine are not met when discriminatory transfer and senior-
ity policies serve "legitimate management functions," since necessity "connotes an irresistible
demand").
127. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in Albemarle, stated: "I fear that a too-rigid
application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer little choice, save an impossibly expen-
sive and complex validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of employment selec-
tion. This, of course, is far from the intent of Title VII." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); accord Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. See, eg., Contreras v. City Of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981), cert,
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982). On the other hand, the defendant's burden should require the intro-
duction of independent evidence that the practice accurately predicts on-the-job performance. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun pointed out that "the bald assertion that a purely discretion-
ary selection process allowed respondent to discover the best people for the job, without any further
evidentiary support, would not be enough to prove job-relatedness." Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2796
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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